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 CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considered Respondents’ motion to substitute themselves as the real parties in 
interest after acquiring Appellants’ rights and interests in the underlying district court action at a 
judgment execution sale, and to dismiss Appellants’ appeal from a district court order. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Although Nevada’s judgment execution statutes permit a judgment creditor to execute on 
a debtor’s personal property, including the right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or 
thing, those statutes do not include the right to execute on a party’s defenses to an action, and 
permitting a judgment creditor to execute on a judgment in such a way would cut off a debtor’s 
defenses in a manner inconsistent with due process principles. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Within the district court, Respondents brought suit against Appellants, alleging breach of 
contract and fraud and tort-based claims related to an asset purchase and sale agreement, under 
which Respondents purchased two furniture stores from Appellants.  Although the Appellants 
answered and filed a counterclaim, arguing that Respondents failed to make payments on the 
promissory note used for the owner-financed purchase of the stores, the district court entered 
judgment for Respondents and allowed Respondents to rescind the agreement. 
 
 Respondents obtained a writ of execution on the judgment, thereby allowing them to 
execute against Appellants’ personal property.  Following Appellants’ unsuccessful attempts to 
restrain the sale of Appellants’ personal property and quash the writ of execution, Respondents 
executed against Appellants’ property by purchasing Appellants’ rights and interests in the 
district court action.   
 
 Respondents argued that NRS 10.045
2
 and NRS 21.080(1)
3
 allowed Respondents to 
execute against Appellants’ defenses as personal property.  As such, Respondents moved to 
substitute as real parties in interest under NRAP 43 and to dismiss the appeal under NRAP 42(b), 
on the basis that Respondents acquired Appellants’ defenses. 4 Appellants opposed the motion 
and argued that an appellant’s defenses to an underlying lawsuit is not personal property subject 
to execution during the pendency of an appeal. 
                                                 
1
  By Robert Stewart. 
2
  NEV. REV. STAT. 10.045 (2007) (defining personal property). 
3
  NEV. REV. STAT. 21.080(1) (2007) (describing property liable to execution).  
4
  Nev. R. App. P. 43 (laying forth the rule on substitution of parties); Nev. R. App. P. 42(b) (laying forth the rule on 
voluntary dismissal in the Supreme Court of Nevada). 
 
 Discussion 
 
 The Court issued a per curiam opinion. The Court first laid forth the parameters of 
personal property, stating that “[u]nder NRS 10.045, personal property includes things in action.” 
Then, after noting that Respondents cited no authority to support the proposition that Appellants’ 
defenses to Respondents’ underlying lawsuit constitute a “thing in action” subject to execution 
under NRS 21.080 and NRS 10.045, and that Respondents offered no authority, nor did the 
Court find any, to support the proposition that a litigant’s defenses are assignable, the Court held 
that Nevada’s judgment execution statutes do not contemplate executing on defensive appellate 
rights as property.  
 
 In noting the adverse results that would exist if the Court were to view defensive 
appellate rights as property and grant Respondents’ motion, the Court stated that such a route 
would foreclose both Appellants’ defenses to Respondents’ underlying claims and Appellants’ 
appeal to the resultant district court order. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court denied Respondents’ motion because Nevada’s judgment execution statutes do 
no contemplate executing on defensive appellate rights as property. 
